The military intervention in the public security of Rio de Janeiro is possibly the most acute manifestation of the political decomposition Brazil is going through. The governmental prosthesis that replaced Dilma Rousseff’s government, destitute by Congress, appeal to desperate movements to contain a crisis that overflow in all fields. The armed forces display with the purpose of fighting the drug traffic threatens to turn Brazil into another Mexico –a violation of human rights regime, which left an amount of 200 thousand dead and murdered. Another numerous Brazilian cities face situations even worse than Rio. The militarization is functional to the electoral development of candidates from the right which advocates for a state of siege political regime.
In the economical field, the generalized privatization of strategic sectors, impulsed by the denounces against the so-called ‘petrolao’ (Petrobras bribes) and the Odebrecht bribes, haven’t created any new wave of investments; on the contrary, the risk qualifiers has lower the Brazilian debt, equivalent a hundred percent of the national production.
This whole frame has created and increasing impasse in the country’s governability. The corruption scandals continue to affect capitalist and political personnel. It’s what happened again with the JBS refrigerating company owners, the main world meat producer, and with president Temer himself, whose bank account had been opened by order of the Justice. The proximity of general elections, in October, hasn’t been useful as exit valve of the crisis, but the entire contrary. This explains that some observers warn the possibility of them to be delayed, to make possible a change in the political regime to parliamentarism. The proscription of Lula, to whom the surveys give winner in the two electoral turns, wouldn’t be enough to arbitrate a result which indulges offcialism and the so-called ‘investors’. Lula has been sentenced in two instances, with a penalty of 12 and a half years, and faces beside several other trials for corruption. The governing circles fear a transfer of votes from Lula to Fernando Haddad, former president of the PT and former mayor of the city of Sao Paulo –Lulism’s B plan. A victory of Haddad would install a bis Dilma Rousseff’s government –a political exit, though innocuous, inacceptable for present power.
The left of this political scene, the PSOL, has not escaped from the crisis, neither to the ‘parliamentary’ coup methods. The PSOL was built after several PT’s parliamentarians were expelled when denied to vote for the retirements’ reform, in the first year of Lula’s government, which attacked the retirement rights of state’s retired. It has been, from the beginning, an apparatus controlled by liberal left politicians, where the whole left took cover, specially the Trotskyist one, who defended it politically to preserve it as an electoral umbrella and parliamentary vehicle. In the municipal elections was also used by the MTR (PTS) and days ago it was admitted a scission of the PSTU –the MAIS. It has covered leaders of clerical orientation and late emigrates from the PT which exercised state’s functions. In the second turn of the latest election, in 2014, it supported the formula Rousseff-Temer. Before the second one kept the chair of the first one, this formula had accentuated the anti-working class ‘adjustment’ policy and taken to the cabinet bankers of the ‘neo-liberal’ current. To make it short, the PSOL is a left agency of Brazil’s political regime.
A couple of days ago, the PSOL suffered its own institutional coup, but at repetition. First, the ‘Foundation’ of PSOL subscribed a political agreement with the PDT, PT and others ‘Foundations’, which program points out the need of making Brazil ‘grow’, with a series of developmental proposals, barely philo-Macrist. The resource of ‘Foundations’ is not capricious, because like this is avoided consulting with militants of the respective parties. The Front has already been baptized as ‘Citizen’, and justifies itself, as it happens in Argentina, as a medium to contain the infringement of democracy in Brazil. It doesn’t pose, though, no concrete contention measurement, which is coherent, since the army was already sent to Rio under the government of Lula –as it were Lula and the PT, governing in alliance with bosses’ parties, who restarted the attack to previsional rights started by his predecessors. The last thing that would pass through the head of the Citizen Front would be to oppose the military high command, which made out, by means of retired militaries, that it has it on its sight, including a veto to the electoral victory of a PT candidate.
The second coupist episode came right away, prepared by the former. The leader of the Movement of Homeless Workers (Movimiento de Trabajadores Sin Techo), Guillherme Boulos, a declared lulist, affiliated to the PSOL and was anointed candidate to President by the liberal majority in the direction, not before receiving a greet of political support from Lula. Immediately he launched his own program –of the same developmental cut as the one presented by the ‘Foundations’. The intention of Boulos is convert the first electoral turn in some Primaries with the candidate designated by PT instead of Lula. The maneuver is supported by the bosses’ parties of the Citizen Front, and it would count with the presence of candidates from the PC do Brazil and the Greens (Verdes). None of this means that other very well-known bosses’ politicians would be set apart the enterprise. For example, Ciro Goméz, former Ceará governor, and Renato Calheiros, from PMDB and promoter of the ‘impeachment’ against Dilma, they have accompanied Lula in his political tours.
It’s clear that the Brazilian political structure is reaccommodating by coups, since it can’t stand the crisis impact and the political and social dislocation for which is responsible. The PSOL Trotskyism has reactioned to these two hits in a row with much anger, since it pretended that the PSOL went to elections with another candidate. Plinio de Arruda Sampaio, a prestigious academic, who denounces the corruption and ‘giving in’ of Lula and Dilma’s governments, and it presents as independent, but he doesn’t inscribe in an organized current, neither of class struggle. Next Saturday will have to resign its vocation before the coupism shared by Lula, Boulos and the PSOL direction.
What will the Trotskyist of the PSOL do, as well as those who affiliate to the Argentina’s FIT, as those who respond to Izquierda para el Cambio (Left for the Change)? They’ve reached the end of a long opportunistic road, focused in a political construction under the shade of the parliamentary little bourgeoisie. They don’t even have space to go back. The most probable is that they fight for a slice in the lists for Congress and Municipalities. They don’t have the right to complaint, because they dug, with special care, their own pit.
The October elections are posed, by the political regime, as a medium to legitimate, with the vote, the coup that removed Dilma –a sort of Macrism ‘post festum’. The uncertainty about reaching this purpose announces attempts of new coups. No left political force in Brazil develops this possibility or foresee even severer crisis; it goes to election with an electoral calculus. The crisis in the PSOL is tainted by this blindness –no one warn the masses that the political regime has its own B plan, which is an electoral assemble that assure them the continuity. Between Lulist and anti-Lulist there is only an electoral fight.
We must discuss the Brazilian situation and the left politics, the democratizing one, as the one pretended revolutionary. The Brazilian call “Orloff effect” the backwash that suffers Brazil or Argentina after any of the two countries had entered, first, in a political crisis.